On 4 January 1981, 32 Battalion’s Alpha, Bravo and Charlie companies joined forces with a company from 1 Parachute Battalion to seek and destroy SWAPO’s Northern Front headquarters, believed to lie west of Ongiva. The parabats deployed south-east of Mongua in anticipation of SWAPO evacuating their bases and moving towards Ongiva, where they could be shielded by FAPLA. The 32 companies would be waiting for them along the most likely route.
The very next day, a SWAPO base 13 km west of Ongiva was attacked from the air and on the ground. Puma helicopters flying in advance stopper groups had to withdraw from the area due to heavy anti-aircraft fire, while radio problems forced two gunships called in for support to turn back to Eenhana. Nevertheless, two platoons from Bravo Company were successfully airlifted to the target area before an Impala air strike with 68-mm rockets silenced the 14,5-mm anti-aircraft guns. An hour later two more Bravo platoons were flown in, and they attacked the base while the gunships offered air support. As expected, SWAPO began withdrawing to the west, but no stopper groups could be inserted due to an operational restriction on air traffic within ten kilometres of Ongiva. Mopping-up operations confirmed that this had been SWAPO’s regional headquarters, and that at least 400 cadres must have been in the base at the time of the assault. The base was spread over an area of 5 000 square metres, with all defences directed towards the east, but the attack had come from the south-west. The bodies of 30 guerrillas were found in the base. A large quantity of documents, three anti-aircraft guns with nine crates of ammunition, a 60-mm mortar and 34 AK47 rifles were taken back to Eenhana.
On 6 January, Bravo Company’s second platoon made contact with 30 SWAPO at a waterhole two kilometres east of Omupande, a known FAPLA stronghold. Later that day, a five-minute mortar bombardment was launched against the same platoon from the direction of Omupande, followed an hour later by a second, and another hour afterwards by a third attack, despite the fact that the platoon had moved position.
By 16 February, despite almost daily contact with small groups of SWAPO, no more large concentrations had been found, and it appeared that the enemy had withdrawn from the area. However, intelligence indicated that detachments on the Northern Front had been ordered to infiltrate into South West Africa between beacons 20 and 21, possibly carrying with them the deadly 122-mm rocket launchers.
On 17 February, one company each from 1 SA Infantry and 8 SA Infantry were deployed as stopper groups, three kilometres apart, east of the Santa Clara–Namacunde road. Two platoons from 32 Battalion were assigned to patrol the area north of Chiede, with another two operating further west, but no SWAPO were found during the seven-day operation.
From 32 Battalion – The Inside Story of South Africa’s Elite Fighting Unit | Piet Nortje