South Africa vs SWAPO Terrorists
The story may be apocryphal, but judging by the depth of sentiment expressed when it is recounted, I doubt it. The way it was told to me by a senior member. of SWAPO’s external military command in Addis Ababa a few years ago, it goes like this-the timing is said to be shortly before the first World War and General Louis Bothe’s Allied invasion of Deutche Sud West.
Apparently the Ovambo nation, already long-standing opponents of German Colonial rule in their corner of a volatile continent, had rejected certain proposals concerning their administration. They were not interested in the White man’s authority and said as much to the ranking Hauptman. A German soldier then dressed himself in the garb of a minister: of religion, enticed an Ovambo group into a Church -ostensibly for Sunday worship- and then had them all gunned down by his troops. The incident which happened more than half a century ago has left its mark. Those Ovambos who are prepared to talk about their recent past maintain that their people have never really forgotten the ruse which resulted in the deaths of so many of them.
Since then this dissident nation, which gave the Germans so much trouble and caused as many headaches to the Portuguese north of the border, has always been somewhat circumspect about “getting together” with the authority of the day. It is only in recent years that a group of Ovambo chiefs-like the Kavongos and the Caprivi leaders-sensing a growing military escalation along their flanks-invited South African forces in to provide protection. Yet there is also a minority who resents this “intrusion” as they call it. For the truth is that the Ovambos are a fiercely proud and individualistic nation.
And while there are today many Ovambos who welcome the South African presence in their midst-and some are even prepared to fight for it-it is largely a problem of the continuing military campaign that- there are some who do not. As bitterly as the majority of these people resent the role of the “Liberation Fighters” who come across the border from Angola in bands during the dark hours to intimidate and kill those who do not cooperate, so too do some of them resent the fact that they have to play host to a sizeable South African force, notwithstanding the fact that were these soldiers to depart tomorrow, it would result in the immediate balkanization of large tracts of northern Southwest Africa in the Angolan revolutionary mold. It is axiomatic, therefore, that they also resent the escalation of this continuing guerrilla, struggle and the uncertainty that comes with any kind of military action: the land mines, the ambushes, counter attacks, static defences, patrols and also the fact that movement about many of their community and social centers is often monitored by defender and aggressor alike.
South African troops on patrol near Angolan border. Note patrol formation , with machine gunner up front carrying radio. (point man not shown), patrol leader, and FN rifleman with contact-breaking rifle grenade attached and ready for counter-ambush action. Machine gun is FN-MAG.
South African troops on patrol near Angolan border. Note patrol formation , with machine gunner up front carrying radio. (point man not shown), patrol leader, and FN rifleman with contact-breaking rifle grenade attached and ready for counter-ambush action. Machine gun is FN-MAG.Almost illogically it would seem to some, they resent too the political overtones that have crept into their everyday way of life, and the fact that if the Southwest African imbroglio is not to be settled politically and with the cognizance of the Western nations, then there can only be a military solution. More ominous, still, if the latter course be chosen, it might ultimately be settled largely on Ovambo soil. And deep down there is more disquiet, this time at family level. Many of the Ovambo people are now feeling the effects of border controls which cut the nation in half from their counterparts still resident in Angola.
They do not understand why Angola’s eradication of all links with the “White South” should result in a curtailment of their traditional liberties, even though the terrorists made much tactical military use of these freedoms in the past. It is this struggle which sometimes, unknowingly, has ranged members of a single family against each other in a military conflict which, if not checked, threatens to envelop all of Southern Africa in a conflict which knows no par in modern African history. For essentially, the war along the northern border of Southwest Africa could be regarded as the classical People’s War, with roughly 400,000 of the Ovambo people caught in a cross fire between two opposing forces. Because of this paradox, an Ovambo village will, consequently, extend exactly the same kind of greeting to a South African military patrol that it gave the previous night to a SWAPO strike force passing through. Invariably the greeting is correct and formal.
Static position guarding mounted bivouac position near Angola. Weapons are from left: FN rifle, Browning light machine gun, and British designed Bren gun converted to .308.
It is rarely-if ever-ingratiating, whether the strangers be black or white, for it is just not done to be overly friendly to one or other of the combatants in a continuing guerrilla struggle. As one villager argued with convincing logic: He spoke in good Afrikaans, ‘En hoekom nie?– ‘n fout kan my lewe kos. (And why not? A mistake could cost us our lives.)” It is one of the anomalies of the continuing military campaign along’ South West Africa’s northernmost border with Angola that while the majority of whites refer to their territory as they have al ways known it, there is barely an Ovambo who calls it anything but Namibia. There are similar contradictions in the Operational area, which today stretches in an unbroken line almost 1,000 kilometers along the frontiers with Black Africa. During my own visit to Ovamboland during June this year I was able to observe several follow-up operations at first hand. One unit with whom I operated for a short while catfooted along a trail only a few hours old. It led from one of. the regular crossing points out of Angola and ended at a village several kilometers from the one kilometer-wide no-go area which has been locally termed the Jati Strip. On inquiring of the locals there about the armed men who had passed through not long before, we were met with vacant stares of the kind usually reserved for the village idiot. No one in the kraal admitted they had even heard of SWAPO, much less seen them; and that in spite of the fact that an army vehicle was demolished by a landmine within easy striking distance of the settlement barely 48 hours later.
LEFT – Mounted troops take a river on the run. These units are invaluable for running down fleeing terrorists. RIGHT – Black and white South African Army troops hold conference during patrol along Angola border. This area has seen much action in past six months. Units such as this have had high kill ratio against terrs.
In retrospect, it was clear that the insurgent group had probably seen us come and go, and since most of these self-appointed “Liberation Fighters” cache their uniforms and arms as soon as they enter South West Africa, there were probably a few of them among the villagers while we were there. It’s the same further into the interior. Point to fresh tracks left a night or two before by a ranging band of terrorists and the inhabitants become surly and uncommunicative. Only hours later is it possible to establish that a group of terrorists did, in fact, pass that way.
But, by then they have probably achieved their aims and are now safely ensconced back at base inside Angola. And a local headman, who you know has had direct contact with a SWAPO operational group, because two of his sons are office bearers in the military wing of the Party, will deny all knowledge of the movement; even though two Soviet grenades and an RPG rocket launcher were found hidden in an anthill about 350 meters from his kraal. And then-as sometimes happens in any war, especially when friends get killed or hurt-one of the young officers on patrol, perhaps a little more zeaious than most, ends up banging a few heads together because it is obvious that SWAPO has enjoyed hospitality in the place. He is brought before his commanding officer and charged under military law for disobeying the explicit command that no man in uniform is to molest the locals iri any way. In many ways the war in Ovamboland differs from other continuing guerrilla campaigns in Africa. In planning and execution it is totally different from Rhodesia’s six-year war where much of the activity is concentrated around small-unit operations centered on using high-lying observation posts (OPs) to gather and pass on information.
In contrast, Ovamboland is a stark, flat and featureless terrain, interspersed only irregularly by a few waterholes, isolated villages, and little else south of the Kunene. While Salisbury’s military planners are devoting. an increasing proportion of military activity to what they term “externals ops” in Zambia and Mozambique, almost all that happens militarily in South West Africa is centered on Ovamboland. The exception to this rule-as we have seen in the recent strikes on “Moscow” and “Vietnam” SWAPO bases, is when rebel elements take to launching full scale raids directly from Angola on to South African positions. Here the Springboks [nickname for the South African troopers] hit back at the source of the action, usually successfully.
In a military sense, the Ovamboland campaign of 1978 is also different from Portugal’s decade-long wars in Africa. For while the various Liberation movements waged a vicious war of attrition against the Portuguese, SWAPO policy avoids any form of direct contact with the security forces unless it cannot be avoided. When a SWAPO section leader does strike, the time, circumstances, and place are always of his choosing. Usually he will restrict his activities to laying several landmines on routes which he knows are used by South African forces, after which he will pull back across the border into Angola. Only rarely will he resort to ambush; and then only when he knows his options are limited and he has got to make a move because of pursuit and he is in danger of being cut off. Consequently, if the army wishes to make contact with the enemy he has to find him first and much of this activity takes place on foot in a terrain where water often becomes more important a consideration than ammunition. It’s a difficult and often backbreaking trudge through the sandy Ovamboland hinterland; the kind of country that soon shows a man for what he really is.
More recently, there have been several new developments. Only lately have horses and motorcycles been brought in to supplement infantry mobility. There has also been a trend towards both forces operating in larger groups. Whereas SWAPO would formerly strike out in units of five or eight men at a time, these terrorists now tend to concentrate their forces, rarely venturing out with less than 15 men at a time, and often deploying groups as strong as 40. Inside Angola, adjacent to the border, observers have noted that SWAPO elements sometimes patrol in groups ranging between 100 and 150. As a consequence, South African patrols have had to be strengthened, for when contact is made with the enemy the outcome is as vicious a firefight as any seen in Southern African in recent years, involving the full gamut of sophisticated hardware, including rockets, machine guns, rifle grenades, automatic weapons, and occasionally, anti-personnel grenades. The materiel used by SWAPO is good. Supplied largely by Eastern Bloc communist states, it is every bit as effective as similar weapons used against United States forces in 10 years of war in Southeast Asia.
LEFT – South African troopie takes a break on patrol. Terrain along Angolan border is sandy, flat, often waterless. Patrols average 6 kms per hour. Troop is armed with FN MAG machine gun. RIGHT – South African troops on patrol along Angola frontier. Out of first five weapons identifiable, four are FN-MAG belt-fed machine guns, one is FN rifle. These units played major role in attack on SW APO bases deep inside Angola.
Gone are the days when five or eight man patrols were able to go out for weeks at a stretch in search of action; these days most operations take place at platoon strength or more. One of the biggest problems associated with the war is SWAPO ‘s reticence to come to grips with the South African army. It has been estimated, as a result, that very few of the troopies on the border ever see the enemy; one statistic quoted puts the figure at about two percent who have seen a terrorist-alive or dead. For this reason, the Ovambo campaign remains at a very low level of intensity although the authorities in Windhoek and Pretoria are aware that any slackening of control could result in a major overnight escalation of hostilities. A major proportion of SWAPO ‘s activities in the region are concentrated on intimidating the local population to follow the Party line “no matter what.” An age-old insurgency tactic, it is SWAPO ‘s contention that the process of undermining government authority remains a prime objective.
And to achieve this aim, the terrorists will stop at nothing. One old man, who was resident in a kraal near Ombalantu north-west of Oshikati, was visited by a band of terrorists one evening and accused of being a government informer; it later transpired that he had taken his wife to the government-run clinic in town. The man was killed in front of his relatives and his body removed. It was later found, decapitated, and strung from a tree in the Jati Strip, festooned with SWAPO propaganda leaflets. As blatant as SWAPO is in running its political campaign in the disputed regions, it is as subtle in looking for exploitable soft military targets. The movement’s spokesmen have declared several times that they are content to bide their time, which is one of the reasons why SWAPO is so insistent that South African forces withdraw from Ovamboland to a line south of Windhoek before discussions about a settlement are started.
Meanwhile the conflict goes on. Both sides have long ago learned that for each strike there is a counter-strike-for each tactic something to counteract it. But then time weighs heavily on both the defender and the attacker, for the South African government has every intention that the territory. will be independent at the end of this year. As fighting men, SWAPO have been variously rated as “poor,” “largely ineffective,” “good,” and in several recent incidents, “outstanding.” The truth lies somewhere in between, for it is no secret that there are SWAPO cadres whose tactics have reflected many years of excellent training. These are the men-the majority with as much as six years of training behind them-that seasoned soldiers in the operational area refer to as SWAPO ‘s “A Team,” in much the same way as players would be graded into various teams at school.
Ovambo troops and their South African officers await pre-patrol inspection at forward base camp in S.W. Africa. Note preference of light machine guns in this and other photos . S. African Army units seem to carry double the number of machine guns as their NATO counterparts.
Further down the scale there is a “B Team” and if someone were to make a serious study of the subject there would undoubtedly be others. Judged according to my own experience of other guerrilla wars in Southern Africa, I would rate SWAPO higher than the majority of forces facing the Rhodesian Army; more aggressive, better disciplined and, broadly speaking, having a more realistic appreciation of weapons’ capability. There is also no comparison between SWAPO and any of the liberation forces opposed to Portuguese rule in either Angola or Mozambique. Unquestionably, SWAPO ‘s “A Team” is regarded as having an excellent leadership. While there are not too many of them, the actions in which they have participated have reflected a sound understanding of all the essentials of unconventional warfare, including the psychological aspect.
These troops are able to operate under the most difficult conditions; one unit of about a dozen men which found itself in trouble some months ago ma~aged to cover 310 kilometers in seven Clays. Rests were brief and food was minimal. One member of this party was later killed by security forces and was found to have nothing in his stomach except beer; indications were that he and his friends had eaten nothing during the previous 24-hour period. Tracking this group was a nightmare for the forces following in their path.
Time and again, the insurgents were able to resort to the most sophisticated anti-tracking measures, which included walking on hands and feet in soft sand for more than two kilometers-a ploy which leaves no recognizable tracks; the average person does well if he can manage 200 meters of that kind of activity. Much use is also made of locals in helping to eradicate tracks when it is known that security forces are near. A herd of goats or cattle will be driven across a spoor to obliterate it, or young children will be ordered to drag branches over a fresh spoor. Back-to-front walking is old hat, but this is not as effective as it used to be since the security forces tend to follow up in both directions of any track that is found. Another factor weighs heavily in the movement’s favor.
Inside South African “Hippo” armored personnel carrier. Vehicle, reinforced against landmines. has twin Browning machine guns, controlled by man upfront, left. Driver is on right, with radio handled by second man on right. Glass is .30 caliber bullet-proof.
SWAPO ‘s bush craft is of the best yet seen in any guerrilla war on this continent. For instance, they are able to use a bow and arrow when they need food and do not wish to attract the attention of any nearby patrol. Conversely their musketry is poor. There have been several attacks on security force positions where several thousand rounds of ammunition (much of it tracer, as is SWAPO ‘s tendency) have been expended for perhaps two or three hits. In one attack on a civilian car last year, almost a thousand cases were afterwards found alongside the road by security forces. Only three bullets hit the vehicle; no one was killed or injured, although SWAPO did wound one of its own men in the onslaught and he was later killed by his colleagues.
Much of SWAPO ‘s training today takes place in Angola. A side effect of this is the organization’s predilection in recent months for the Cuban olive-green uniform and bush cap. Other training bases have been sited in Zambia, Tanzania, and in several Iron Curtain countries. Unlike several other terrorist organizations, the SWAPO hierarchy is firmly ensconced within the Soviet camp. China is regarded as anathema and SWAPO leaders say so.
Certainly the biggest problem facing authorities in northern South West Africa is that terrorist activity is usually at its worst where the population is thickest. Another is the fact that the Ovambo nation of more than 400,000 souls is not a single nation, as is commonly supposed, but a conglomerate of fiercely proud and individualistic tribes seven in all. The largest of these tribes, numbering about 80,000 people, is the Kwanyama whose major distinction is the fact that a similar number of its people live in permanent exile on the other side of the Angolan border. While the Kwanyamas regard themselves as superior to all other Ovambo peoples, they are even more arrogant when it comes to dealings with other South West African groups. An Ovambo in the ordinary course of events wilI not even speak to a Kavango.
South African Army troops lift body of dead terr off Hippo armored vehicle during operations on Angolan border. Terrs usually concentrate on c1v1hans, try to avoid better trained and disciplined SA army troops.
It is because the Kwanyamas (the Angolan spelling is Cuanyamas) are split across a common frontier that much of the present-day problems have originated; a nation whose loyalties were torn down the middle in the crazy European scramble for Africa in the 19th century. Agreement between Britain and Portugal as to the border between the two Colonial territories was only reached after World War I. It was then that the division of the traditional homeland of the Kwanyama tribe along an arbitrary line of latitude was institutionalized. Father and son, brother and sister found themselves living in different countries, being administered by separate laws and two totally different colonial concepts.
So it continued for many years. The Kwanyamas accepted the peculiar whims of their respective white governments. For the Portuguese the southern Angolan border was a remote spot; they called it ” the end of the world.” For the South Africans, the northern South West African border was the extremity of an area it was .administrating_ under a League of Nations mandate. With the outbreak of a guerilla war in Angola in 1961, conditions ‘changed almost overnight. Border controls tightened-Portugal eager to seal off any inflow of support and South Africa wanting to prevent revolution lapping over into its territory. For the Kwanyamas the frontier had become a reality. But the Kwanyamas gradually became entangled in the Angolan struggle. If they supported the liberation movements, they fell foul of the Portuguese security forces. If they supported the administering power, they become traitors to the revolution. Attempts at neutrality earned these proud tribespeople the suspicion and contempt of both. Ironically, the same situation holds for South West Africa today. Then came a Portuguese defeat and those Kwanyamas living north of the border argued that if it could be done once, it could be achieved a second time. Why not!
Ovambo cadres were sent from Angola into northern South West Africa on missions of intrigue to persuade their cousins that the time for revolution had arrived. So it had; those who were not interested in identifying themselves with a military struggle were warned that if they were not killed, their wives and children would be. Similar threats were made about property. And the Ovambos, being thoroughly family oriented, took notes. Gradually the revolution gathered strength, buttressed by regular kidnappings of schoolchildren, for by now SWAPO cadre leaders were espousing the view that “today’s children are tomorrow’s leaders” : a Marxist cliche which makes good sense in Africa. But the revolutionaries have not had it all their way.
According to military authorities in Oshikati, a fair proportion of the Ovambo community has become more than disgruntled with the demands made upon them by terrorist groups passing through. Each group, it is argued, has to be fed. And because the average SWAPO farmer grows only enough for himself and his family, someone must go hungry for several months of the year if terrorist requisitions are too heavy. They usually are. For this reason, it is maintained that of the entire Ovambo nation in northern South West Africa about 20 percent of the population are declaredly pro-SWAPO. A similar number are anti. It’s the 60 percent in the middle that have not yet committed themselves to the outcome. It’s largely about them that the current phase of hostilities is centered.
SOF Magazine Nov 1978 – Al J. Venter