How rapidly times alter. As the so-called ‘Winds of Change’ swept through colonial Africa, the process of decolonisation gathered inexorable pace. Rhodesia was a prominent example. In July 1964, it experienced its first terrorist incident when a white farmer was murdered. Relations with the British government worsened the following year over the issue of majority rule, resulting in Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965. To some it was the fulfilment of a long-held dream. To others, in both countries, the view was very different.
For the Rhodesian armed forces, the decade-and-a-half from 1964 was a period of intense conflict on the domestic front. Insurgent operations by African nationalist forces, their aim to overturn white rule, saw to that. To some extent it was a case of ‘Cold War by proxy’, the insurgents being variously supported by the Soviet Union and China. Rhodesia, of course, was still operating a considerable amount of British equipment.
In late 1962, the small, but very efficient, Royal Rhodesian Air Force received the first of a dozen Hunter FGA9s. They replaced DH Vampires with 1 Squadron at Thornhill near Gwelo in the central highlands of Rhodesia, now Gweru in today’s Zimbabwe, and meant the air arm now flew probably the best fighters in sub-Saharan Africa. 1 Squadron’s tasks were air defence, close air support and air interdiction, as well as assistance to the civil powers. With most equipment coming from Britain, the imposition of a UN embargo required ingenuity and improvisation by the engineers. In mid-1966, when commanded by Sqn Ldr Chris Dams, 1 Squadron developed a fighter reconnaissance capability, which proved useful during operations.
A force of 94 terrorists crossed the Zambezi River around Victoria Falls using rubber boats on the night of 31 July 1966 and made their way to the sparsely populated interior. They had been in Rhodesia for 10 days when it was established that they were members of the South African ANC and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Operation ‘Nickel’ was launched to neutralise them and on 22 August the Hunters flew their first mission, strafing the guerrillas. By early September most of the insurgents had been killed or captured.
To coincide with a visit to Britain by Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda in July 1968, several groups infiltrated into Rhodesia, so Operation ‘Griffin’ on the 20th saw the Hunters attacking a ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) cadre caught in a gully. During Operation ‘Mansion’, Hunter attacks were made with the aid of a forward air controller in an Aermacchi AL-60, directing attacks on insurgents in Devil’s Gorge on the Zambezi.
The Hunter’s weapons suite was expanded during 1969 with trials of the RRAF’s own design of napalm bomb, the ‘Frantan’ (frangible tank). Now under Sqn Ldr Roy Morris, the 1 Squadron pilots introduced the 18lb (8kg) rocket projectile, which became the standard weapon for internal security taskings. When on 2 March 1970 Rhodesia was declared a republic, the markings were changed to green and white roundels surrounding a gold lion, and the RRAF became known as the Rhodesian Air Force.
Such additions as 68mm Matra rocket pods in July 1972 were timely, as from December Operation ‘Hurricane’ began covering north-eastern Rhodesia to counter incursions across the Zambezi from Zambia. Three times Hunters were placed on readiness at Victoria Falls, and during February four aircraft flown by the CO, Sqn Ldr Rob Gaunt, Flt Lt Culpan, Flt Lt Jones and Air Lt Baldwin hit a terrorist base in a ravine under a cloudbase of only 100ft. Two jets provided top cover during efforts in May to retrieve the bodies of two Canadian women and an American man from the Zambezi gorge, shot dead by Zambian soldiers.
Use of the 18lb RP began, though initially there were some problems with gunsight harmonisation. They were employed on 4 April 1974 when Hunters conducted a combined strike with Canberras near Macombe in the Tete province of Mozambique. When an AL-60 was shot down over Mozambique 10 days afterwards, two Hunters, in the hands of Flt Lts Vic Wightman and Rickie Culpan, made a search. Breaking either side of a kopje (a small, isolated hill) at low level, they spotted a smoke trail as an SA-7 heat-seeking missile was fired, though it flew between them. The pilots spotted its origin and plastered the area with gunfire.
August’s collapse of the Portuguese Army in Mozambique, in the wake of a coup in Portugal, led to the FRELIMO guerrilla movement swiftly assuming control. At a stroke, this massively increased the length of the border area threatened by incursions, and thus the Rhodesians’ problems. The Bush War escalated into a bitter, bloody conflict between on one side the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZIPRA nationalist guerrillas, and on the other the Rhodesians, who now faced a well-organised enemy on three fronts.
Rhodesia had descended into war by early 1976. Strikes on ZANLA camps in Mozambique and ZIPRA in Zambia began as the terror campaign intensified. The first major cross-border strike came in late February when Hunters attacked a ZANLA base during Operation ‘Small Bang’, though it was not a great success. On such raids the air force initially had little to fear, for while neighbouring countries now possessed comparable aircraft to the Hunter, they lacked suitable training and air defence systems. However, man-portable SA-7s and anti-aircraft fire remained a threat.
A ‘Frantan’ attack on 6 May 1976 by two Hunters resulted in five ZANLA members killed and two captured, the first real success of Operation ‘Repulse’. After a concerted rocket and artillery bombardment near Mount Selinda on the Mozambique border, the on-call fighters were scrambled on 10 June. They were led by Flt Lt ‘Dude’ Thomas, the ‘A’ Flight commander in serial R1280. Armed with 68mm Matra rockets and with Air Lt Martin Lowrie carrying ‘Frantans’, they went to support troops under fire near Espungabera on the border. Thomas took out the command post, killing 11 terrorists, but was hit by small arms fire, causing a hydraulic failure. He ejected near Thornhill.
ZANLA attacks in early August led the Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to approve the first significant cross-border raid, Operation ‘Eland’. A large ZANLA base was suspected, but nothing was spotted until by accident a sizeable camp was found on the bend of the Pungwe River tributary in Mozambique by a reconnaissance Canberra. A ‘flying column’ from the Selous Scouts special forces group hit it, causing many casualties. As the force withdrew and approached the border, FRELIMO elements opened fire. Hunter support was called in, hitting the mortar and machine gun positions with devastating accuracy. Operation ‘Mardon’ in Mozambique’s Gaza province at the end of October involved Hunters providing top cover as the Scouts conducted a hot pursuit action. Within days Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) and Light Infantry ( RLI) troops were back in Mozambique, targeting the ZANLA base at Mavue.
The same province was a focus of attention for several months of 1977. In mid-January, Canberras used new ‘Alpha’ bouncing bombs against the Madulo Pan transit camp near Mapai, backed up by a pair of Hunters. During Operation ‘Manyatela’ the Selous Scouts’ column called in air support and, in the face of very heavy ground fire, Hunters delivered RP and cannon attacks against a FRELIMO column that had arrived to support the ZANLA fighters. Operation ‘Aztec’, a deep-penetration raid by the Selous Scouts towards targets around Mapai, began at last light on 28 May. As Rhodesian troops closed on the objective, Hunter support was effectively delivered, helping restrict ZANLA movements into south-eastern Rhodesia.
The SAS began concerted operations in Gaza province at the end of October, similar to successful actions in Tete to the north. They directed Hunters onto the first road convoy they spotted and the vehicles were destroyed. A month on, again assisting the SAS in Operation ‘Melon’, 1 Squadron’s jets dived into a hail of FRELIMO and ZANLA fire. The bush was soon littered with explosions and burning vehicles. Pairs of Hunters made successive strikes, each being replaced by another as they returned to rearm. The attack was maintained for five hours. A recce team confirmed that the FRELIMO brigade had been organised by Soviet ‘advisors’.
An audacious plan was devised to hit both Chimoio, the largest and most important ZANLA base in Mozambique, under Operation ‘Dingo’, and Tembu in the north-east of Tete province. It took place in appalling conditions on 23 November, with a cloudbase of barely 300ft (90m). Every available aircraft was committed to the biggest set-piece attack of the war thus far. They began at 07.30hrs with co-ordinated strikes by eight Hunters from Thornhill, led by Sqn Ldr Rich Brand, dive-bombing the targets and marking them for 5 Squadron’s Canberras. No anti-aircraft fire was seen as helicopters arrived when the jets went back home to rearm. The Hunters then hit further targets, attacks continuing as the Rhodesians occupied the camp before withdrawing at dusk on the 24th. An estimated 2,000 terrorists were killed, significantly slowing ZANLA infiltrations for the next year.
By the end of 1977 the Hunters were fitted with Matra Type 155 rocket pods, modified to allow the pilot to fire at intervals. Also available was the Rhodesian-designed 450kg (1,000lb) ‘Golf’ percussion bomb with a 1m (3ft 2in) proboscis on the nose allowing it to explode above ground. One of the pilots, Flt Lt Tony Oakley, said, “The ‘Golf’ bombs had to be dropped from as near vertical as possible, so we had endless troubles getting the sighting picture right. You dropped in a dive and throttled back at the same time, doing your best to keep the sight under control. We pressed the release when a light came on, indicating that we were at the correct height.”
A large ZIPRA base was found near Kavalamanja, Zambia during February 1978, leading to the Operation ‘Turmoil’ combined assault. Following heavy rain, it was 1 Squadron’s Hunters that opened the attack, hitting anti-aircraft positions prior to a Canberra strike. At least one SA-7 was fired at the Hunters, as recalled by Oakley: “We actually saw the Strela launch as an opportunity to pinpoint the buggers. Then we could stomp them nicely with the cannon. One such occasion was at Kavalamanja when a Strela team launched a couple at Vic Wightman and me from a vehicle. There is something very satisfying about having a vehicle in your gunsights. They found themselves on the receiving end of a large number of 30mm shells.”
The war was becoming increasingly savage. On 3 September 1978, an SA-7 shot down Air Rhodesia Vickers Viscount VP-WAS Hunyani after taking off from Kariba and the survivors were massacred by ZIPRA guerrillas. It was an SA-7 that hit Flt Lt Dave Bourhill over Chimoio on September 20th during Operation ‘Snoopy’, though he managed to land R1827 safely, even with severe damage.
In retaliation for the Viscount incident, Operation ‘Gatling’ was a daring raid on around 3,000 ZIPRA guerrillas at Westlands Farm, three miles from the Zambian capital Lusaka. Four Canberras were supported by eight Hunters, two of which carried air-to-air missiles, as top cover should Zambia’s MiGs choose to interfere. Due to their speed and quiet arrival, the Hunters were the aircraft most feared by the opposing forces. They descended to low level and joined the bombers for the attack, marking the target for them. The opening strike was closely pursued by the arrival of a heli-borne assault force. The top cover, Red section, orbited the main Zambian Air Force base at Mumbwa to attack any aircraft taking off.
As a pall of smoke hung over Lusaka, the next phase began against a base at Mkushi, 100 miles north-east. The Hunters followed the Canberras before the troops arrived, and panic ensued on the ground. A Zambian MiG appeared overhead but offered no threat. It was estimated that more than 1,500 terrorists were killed. Soon afterwards, near Kazangula in the extreme west of Rhodesia, a Hunter intercepted an Angolan MiG-21 flown by a Cuban pilot. He fled Rhodesian airspace when the Hunter pilot fired a warning burst from his 30mm cannon.
A second Viscount, VP-YND Umniati, was shot down by an SA-7 having taken off from Kariba on 12 February 1979, causing 59 deaths. Its destruction led to devastating strikes against ZIPRA. On the 15th and 16th Hunters hit camps in the Livingstone area, and on the 18th they went for ZANLA buildings near Chimoio. Two bases in Zambia were struck on 23 February, followed by the most ambitious raid yet when four Canberras targeted a ZIPRA camp near Luso in central Angola on the 26th. These missions undoubtedly made the Zambians jumpy, for that day they shot down one of their own Macchi MB326s. The cross-border activity continued, including attacks by Hunters at Chimoio on 17 March. As FRELIMO cautiously returned on the 18th, an SAS team on the ground requested a further Hunter strike. It was engaged by an SA-7, which was evaded and the operator dealt with. Hunters also aided an SAS raid on oil installations in the Mozambique port of Beira.
The remarkable serviceability of the type was evident on 26 June, when nine of the 10 Hunters conducted a flypast over the parliament building in Salisbury. Only that morning they had supported a successful SAS mission against ZIPRA’s intelligence HQ in Lusaka. Six days later, Hunters and Canberras made the initial strike on a camp west of Lusaka before the SAS assault force arrived by helicopter. Zambian MiGs took off but made no attempt to interfere, though when attacking Mulungushi on the 22nd a pair of MiG-19s intercepted the Hunters. As the unit diary noted, “Fortunately they were as clueless as we were, stooging around doing nothing. Consequently, we dropped our bombs and repositioned.”
At the beginning of September 1979, to forestall an offensive, Rhodesia launched Operation ‘Uric’ against guerrilla bases around Mapai in Mozambique’s Gaza Province. Beginning with several days’ delay, due to ill luck the Rhodesians lost the key element of surprise. At 07.00hrs on the 5th, four Hunters led the attack on strategic bridges at Barragem. Flying along the Limpopo valley through unexpectedly heavy fire, they scored direct hits on the gun emplacements and barracks. The following day Hunters delivered ‘Golf’ bombs and hit a radar station used for directing SAMs as the first wave went in. The second wave of Hunters and Canberras entered the fray 30 minutes afterwards in a fierce anti-aircraft barrage and were fortunate to avoid damage. The battle then began to go badly, with increasing losses as the guerrilla forces showed much greater competence. Strike upon strike was called in and delivered with the usual accuracy, but to little avail, so by mid-afternoon a withdrawal was ordered.
Although it had been a shattering blow to the enemy, the Rhodesians had not achieved all their aims. The Hunters and Canberras mounted further strikes even deeper into Gaza Province and much damage was caused to communications and radar installations. However, by previous standards ‘Uric’ was not a success and although infiltration did slow, Rhodesian losses were unacceptably high. It was the beginning of the end.
The huge base at Chimoio, dominated by a large rock kopje nicknamed ‘Monte Cassino’, was the subject of another attack at the month’s end. The Hunters plastered the area with ‘Golf’ bombs, and eventually on the 28th the feature fell, the Rhodesians controlling the complex until the 30th. But recce groups remained behind, and on 3 October a heavily armed FRELIMO column was threatening the Rhodesian border again. Strikes were ordered, but they proved very expensive indeed. During the first attack a Canberra was shot down, but further waves still went in amid atrocious conditions of smoke and haze. With the death of 21-year-old Air Lt Brian Gordon, Hunter R1821 was downed, apparently crashing into the column and causing considerable destruction. It was the costliest operation of the entire war for the air force. As one pilot said, “The losses rattled us all to our boots.”
Peace talks were being conducted in London, and on 22 November the Rhodesian Security Forces were ordered to cease all external operations, a ceasefire becoming effective on 17 December. Upon the holding of elections, the independent state of Zimbabwe came into being on 17 April 1980, and the Rhodesian Air Force disappeared into history. However, nine of the Hunter FGA9s survived the war to be passed on the new Air Force of Zimbabwe.
By Andrew Thomas