On 20 February, Sector 10 headquarters issued Operational Order 2/80, authorising 52 Battalion and 32 Battalion to conduct an operation to clear the area north of Beacon 6 to Beacon 13 of SWAPO. From his tactical headquarters at Ogongo, Ferreira would command six platoons from 32’s Bravo, Echo and Golf companies, consisting of 171 men; three companies from 52 Battalion totalling 277 men; two groups from 1 Parachute Battalion; and mine-laying and mine-locating teams from 25 Field Squadron.
It was to be a seek-and-destroy operation, with 52 Battalion sweeping north from the border to an imaginary line called Bravo, moving east to west through Nepolo. The six platoons of 32 Battalion would sweep south from positions 45 km north of Cuamato to the Bravo line. In the second phase, 52 Battalion had to establish dominance of the area between the border and Bravo, while 32 Battalion conducted an east-west sweep to another imaginary line, Alpha.
The 32 platoons arrived at Ondangwa on 22 February, and three days later were transported to Ombalantu in Buffel armoured personnel carriers. At 07h45 on 26 February, they were airlifted in Puma helicopters to positions 45 km inside Angola.
The companies from 52 Battalion first saw action on 1 March, when they captured one of six SWAPO guerrillas after a contact at Caco, about 20 km north of the border. Under interrogation, the captive admitted he was a member of a forward reconnaissance patrol, due to link up with a larger group armed with 82-mm mortars and a B10 recoilless gun, prior to attacking the bases at Mahanene and Okalongo. He also led his captors to a cache, about ten kilometres away, of 21 anti-tank mines and mortars.
On 3 March, 32’s platoons were about ten kilometres inside Angola when a member of the local population provided information about a SWAPO base west of the Cunene River, a kilometre from Calueque. Since this was well outside the area they had been assigned to patrol, they did not follow up. At 10h45, Golf Company’s second platoon was following the tracks of ten SWAPO seven kilometres east of Naulila, when they found a large underground cache containing 17 bags of maize meal. After the platoon sergeant had prodded the bags to check for anti-personnel mines, Rifleman M Yenga made to remove one. It was booby-trapped after all, and an APPMISR anti-personnel jump mine detonated, killing Yenga and wounding riflemen M Bocolo and M Carlos, as well as Corporal B Dixisi.
At 08h05 on 5 March, Bravo Company’s first platoon spotted five SWAPO about 12 km south of Naulila. As they opened fire, the platoon came under attack from a group of buildings 400 m away. With two enemy confirmed dead, the first and second platoons joined forces and swept through the buildings, but SWAPO had already moved on. The platoons continued moving south, arriving at Beacon 3 around last light, then returned to Ruacana. This marked the end of Makalani, but no sooner were the troops back in their base than orders for Makalani II were issued. This time, the area between beacons 8 and 12 was to be patrolled as far as Cuamato and Dombondola. Echo Company was brought in from Elundu to boost the ranks of 32 to nine platoons.
Bravo and Golf companies crossed the border by last light on 7 March, with two platoons each crossing at beacons 10, 11 and 12, moving north for five kilometres and assuming ambush positions for the night.
The next day, Ferreira informed Sector 10 headquarters that although a large area had already been covered, no enemy presence was found, and he believed SWAPO had moved further north. Echo Company arrived at Ondangwa later that day, and by the evening of 9 March, Bravo Company’s first and third companies were deployed seven kilometres north of Beacon 10. The second platoon, along with Golf Company’s first platoon, was 12 km north of Beacon 11, and Golf Company’s second and third platoons were eight kilometres north of Beacon 13.
At 07h30 the next morning, Bravo Company’s first and third platoons made contact with SWAPO for the first time in the area. Guards spotted a large group of enemy passing close to their temporary base, and the platoons immediately formed an extended line and began to advance. After a brief but intense firefight, two enemy dead were found, and the platoon captured two 82-mm mortars and 40 bombs, AK47 rifles and a Draganov sniper rifle – a source of particular concern, as only SWAPO specialist groups on a specific mission were known to carry this weapon.
At noon on 11 March, Bravo Company’s first and third platoons were lying in ambush at a chana 15 km north of Beacon 9, when a group of SWAPO appeared about 300 m away, moving from north to south. The platoons opened fire, killing one man. He was found to be carrying a Tokarev pistol and documents indicating that he was a commander in SWAPO’s naval force. Echo Company moved into the area around Dombondola that day and began sweeping the area. At 19h00, a member of the local population steered the company’s third platoon to a SWAPO temporary base. A sentry spotted them at about 75 m and was shot as he ran to warn his ten comrades, who fled at the first sound of gunfire. Twice during the night, at 00h12 and again at 04h00, the platoon’s temporary base came under 60-mm mortar fire, but the bombs fell about 100 m short during both attacks. That night, three Echo Company platoons in the area heard three vehicles moving from north to south, stopping for about 30 minutes and then returning to the north, indicating that troops and equipment had been offloaded for a possible attack on Mahanene base. Around lunch-time the next day, air reconnaissance confirmed fresh vehicle tracks between the chanas, and some two hours later the third platoon also found human and donkey tracks, another familiar omen of an impending attack.
Bravo Company’s second platoon was sent to Oncuaoncua, about 14 km west of Dombondola, to try to find the attack force and lay ambushes. The other platoons took up ambush positions on the roads between beacons 7 and 12. Echo Company’s first platoon came upon a group of SWAPO doing their laundry in a shona north-east of Dombondola, wounded one and captured another. That evening, the second platoon made contact with a 50-strong group of SWAPO in the same general area. A 45-minute confrontation, including air support from the helicopter gunships, left six enemy dead and platoon commander Second Lieutenant MJ van Staden wounded in the stomach.
Interrogation of the captured guerrilla revealed that SWAPO had a base for about 60 men west/south-west of Chetaquera. Despite informing headquarters at Oshakati that the exact position of the base was unknown, and that there was no certainty that it was occupied, Ferreira was ordered to attack. A detailed plan, including the use of gunships and Pumas to airlift the ground troops, reserve forces at Ombalantu and air support from four Impalas, was approved by Brigadier Witkop Badenhorst, Officer Commanding Sector 10, and swung into action at 08h15 on 13 March, but neither a base nor any enemy were found.
Two days later, an Echo Company platoon returned to the scene of the earlier contact at Dombondola, and found a SWAPO guerilla’s body that had been missed during the post-contact sweep. At 18h50, while following the spoor of four enemy, the platoon spotted their quarry and opened fire with 60-mm mortars. Unfortunately, due to wet charges, one of the bombs fell horribly short, exploding among the platoon’s own members and wounding Second Lieutenant AW Kruger, riflemen RE Evaristo and P Frans, and Corporal CC da Trinidade. The corporal died of his wounds in the hospital at Grootfontein.
With three lieutenants wounded or in hospital for routine medical treatment and a corporal dead, the platoons were thrown into a leadership crisis, and combined forces to overcome the problem.
At 07h00 on 18 March, while patrolling the area south of Cuamato, members of Golf Company’s second and third platoons were talking to members of the local population when eight SWAPO strolled into sight. Both sides opened fire simultaneously, but the SWAPO cadres swiftly scattered to the south and west, hotly pursued by members of the platoon. By 09h00 the Alouette gunships were aloft, coming under fire from RPG 7 rockets and small arms four kilometres east of Cuamato. Two 7,62-mm rounds hit one of the helicopters.
At 09h30, Impalas were placed on standby at Ondangwa when the gunships again drew fire, this time from buildings in the town. The Alouette crews opened fire with their 20-mm guns on a group of up to 30 SWAPO running for the safety of a house with a red roof, and noted that two wounded soldiers were being dragged towards the house. The gunships poured 20-mm fire into the building through the roof, and reported spotting radio masts in the backyard, a sure sign that it was being used as some type of headquarters. At 10h00, two Impalas bombarded the target, and at 11h35 two Pumas dropped off troops to sweep the town. SWAPO was long gone, leaving behind one dead, the blood trails of several wounded, food and clothing, and a series of shallow trenches.
By 17h00 on 20 March, three platoons were back at Ombalantu, followed 24 hours later by the rest. One Echo Company platoon was flown to Chetaquera to launch Operation Makalani III, and spent the next five days searching for the SWAPO group that had escaped. Despite reports from the local population that three separate SWAPO groups were still in the area, and that one had visited their village to obtain food, nothing but tracks were found before the platoon was relieved on 25 March by a company from 1 Parachute Battalion.