On 22 April 1978, a group of SWAPO hijacked a bus travelling between Oshakati and Ruacana and drove the 73 passengers aboard across the border into Angola. Three days later, the South African government formally accepted proposals for a negotiated settlement to the problem of South West Africa, and three days after that a group of 100 SWAPO engaged security forces in western Owamboland before making for the safety of Angola.
What neither the international community nor SWAPO realised was that even as South Africa was agreeing to seek a political solution and withdraw its forces, it was planning the first major attack inside Angola since Operation Savannah.
According to official records, Operation Reindeer was the first time since December 1975 that the SADF engaged the forces of another country on foreign soil. This, of course, is neither historically accurate nor true, since 32 Battalion had been fighting against FAPLA and its Cuban surrogates inside Angola since 1976, albeit on a limited and non-conventional scale.
Reindeer was to be a three-phase operation, starting with an airborne attack by 44 Parachute Brigade, led by Colonel Jan Breytenbach, on Target Alpha, or Cassinga – SWAPO’s main training and logistical base 250 km inside Angola, heavily defended with an elaborate trench system, artillery and anti-aircraft guns, known as Moscow. Battle Group Juliet, commanded by Commandant Frank Bestbier, would launch ground attacks in the western sector around Chetaquera on Target Bravo, SWAPO’s headquarters – called Vietnam – the Mahama transit camp to the south; the logistical base known as Windhoek; and four smaller bases – Chatua, Dombondala 1 and 2 and Haimona.
In the third and final phase, 32 Battalion would attack 17 suspected SWAPO bases in the eastern sector between beacons 26 and 30, operating up to 30 km inside Angola. The battalion’s mission was spelled out in Operational Order No. 4/78, issued on 26 April. Major Eddie Viljoen would command five 32 Battalion companies, one medium artillery troop of 140-mm guns and an 81-mm mortar platoon. No offensive air support would be available.
During the planning stage, it was found that very little or no information was available on the bases earmarked for attack by 32, and a decision was made to focus on the ‘shallow’ targets rather than going for deep penetration into unknown territory.
Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Echo companies linked up with the artillery troop at Elundu, but the gunners only arrived at a late stage in the preparations, leaving very little time for coordinated drills. It wasn’t long before the realisation set in that Phase 3 of the operation had been accorded less priority during the planning stage than the attacks on targets Alpha and Bravo, a deficiency that would prove critical as Reindeer progressed.
The airborne assault – the largest operational parachute drop since World War II – and Battle Group Juliet’s offensive began on 4 May, but it was not until 6 May that 32 Battalion was authorised to initiate Phase 3. The plan was to systematically destroy one base after another in the following sequence: Minquita (or H, Hotel being the name used by 32 for this chana), Namuidi, Omelepapa, Henombe, Target 3 (a chana three kilometres north-west of Henombe), Onalumona, Ohaipeto, Target 6, Jaano, Mamuandi, Chinota, Hangadima, Bau (the closest base, just three kilometres from the border), Namixi, Candombe, Canhama and Tecole.
During the night of 5 May, Viljoen’s force moved from Elundu to Chana Nunda, and by 04h00 on 6 May the artillery was in position just south of the border. At 04h15, Alpha, Bravo and Delta companies crossed the cutline, leaving Charlie as protection for the artillery and Echo in reserve at the tactical headquarters at Elundu.
At 08h00, contact was made with SWAPO at Chana Minquita. After firing mortars at the 32 platoons, the enemy hightailed it north-east to Chana Namuidi. Viljoen’s men immediately pushed north, forming up 500 m south of Chana Namuidi, with one company deployed on each side of the road from Minquita.
Artillery support was called in, directed by an officer in a spotter aircraft piloted by João Martins, a former Angolan flying for the SAAF. Orders from the ground were for a single gun to be fired to ‘shoot in’ or find the range. The first shell exploded some 500 m short of the base. The correction was communicated, but instead of waiting for a second single shell to be fired to confirm that it was on target, the airborne controller issued the order: ‘Troop bombardment, five shots fire for effect.’
The first shell hit the mark, but the two rounds fired by each of the other three guns either exploded while still in the air, or hit the ground some six metres in front of the 32 troops. The bombardment was halted immediately, but the damage had already been done. Sergeant CJ Theron was killed, sergeants Ron Gregory and Blue Kelly suffered serious shrapnel wounds, and another 16 troops were less seriously wounded.
With that number of casualties, any attempt to attack the base would have been disastrous, and Viljoen withdrew his men three kilometres south to regroup and evacuate the wounded. The bitter fruit of late and inadequate planning for Phase 3 of Reindeer was plucked when it took two hours for the casevac helicopters to arrive. No one had thought to inform the SAAF that their services would be required during Phase 3, and the time lapse afforded SWAPO the ideal opportunity to evacuate their base and head for Chana Omelepapa.
That night, Viljoen’s force remained in position three kilometres south of Chana Minquita. The next morning the artillery and Charlie Company moved up to join them, and were in position by noon. Predictably, when the three assault companies entered the base, they found it deserted. By 18h00 the facilities had been destroyed, and the companies formed a laager north of the chana for the night. The artillery, meanwhile, moved to a new position at Chana Namuidi.
At 20h00, the overnight base was attacked with 14 122-mm rockets fired from the direction of Onalumona. Fortunately there were no casualties, but the bombardment confirmed that the enemy was still in the vicinity.
A change of strategy was clearly needed, however, and the SAAF was called in to airlift the troops to the next target in Puma and Super Frelon helicopters.
This gave 32 a much needed advantage, and by noon on 8 May, Chana Omelepapa had been cleared and the SWAPO base destroyed. By 12h30, Target 3 had suffered the same fate, followed in quick succession by Onalumona (16h00), Henombe (17h00) and Ohaipeto (18h00). By 19h00, all the companies involved were back at Chana Namuidi.
Throughout the day the same tactics had been applied – the targets being bombarded by the artillery or mortars before the ground troops moved in by helicopter or on foot. After this, however, the helicopters returned to base, and the rest of the operation was carried out according to the original plan.
By 11h00 on 9 May the artillery was in position at Chana Henombe to fire on the remaining targets, and by 13h00 Chana Chinota was secured. By 16h00 the base at Chana Jaano had been destroyed and the force moved back to Chinota, where they set up a defensive position for the night.
At 10h00 on 10 May, officially the last day of the operation, the base at Chana Hangadima was attacked. While this assault was in progress, Charlie Company was sent back to the cutline to secure the area at Chana Omelepapa, to which the artillery would pull back. At 14h00, the base at Mamuandi was destroyed, followed by Chana Bau. When no enemy presence was found at Candombe and Canhama, Alpha Company was sent back to the border, leaving Bravo and Delta to destroy the base at Namixe, which was accomplished by 18h00. The last target on the list, Tecole, was attacked at 09h00 on 11 May, after which the two companies moved south, rejoining Charlie and Alpha companies and the artillery troop south of the border by 10h00.
An official inquiry into the death of Sergeant Theron showed that the guns used during the operation had been standing at Grootfontein since Savannah, and due to lack of routine maintenance, seals had perished, rendering them wholly inaccurate. In the hasty preparation for Reindeer the guns had not been calibrated, thus presenting a far greater danger to their own forces than to any enemy.
Composition of Battle Group Juliet
Commander: Commandant Frank Bestbier
21C: Major Andre Kruger
Combat Team 1: Major Ep van Lill
Combat Team 2: Major PW de Jager
Combat Team 3: Lieutenant MJ Muller
Echelon Commander: WO1 PH Rohrbeck