Six months earlier, during Operation Bucksaw, it had been determined that there was a major SWAPO base some six kilometres north-west of Chana Golf. Aerial reconnaissance photographs of the base had been taken, and documents captured at Tofima during Seiljag 3 referred to a SWAPO regimental headquarters at Ohaipete, or Eheke. Interrogation of prisoners had confirmed that this was the main SWAPO base, which was given the SADF code-name Target 21.
Operation Kropduif (pouter pigeon) would take place in two phases, with attacks on Chana Tofima and Chana Nutalala before 24 October, to be followed by a combined 32 Battalion and Special Forces assault on Eheke. On 21 October, 12 rifle platoons and an 81-mm mortar group were transported from Omauni to Chana Nunda, between beacons 27 and 28. A tactical headquarters was set up at Elundu under command of Commandant Gert Nel, OC 32 Battalion, and Commandant J Kriel of the SAAF, who would be in charge of the helicopters used during the operation.
By 17h00 on 22 October, Corporal FH le Roux’s mortar group and Second Lieutenant PSC Myburg’s protection platoon were in position south of the border. At 05h15 the next day, five platoons under command of Major Eddie Viljoen crossed into Angola, attacking the SWAPO base at Chana Tofima 45 minutes later from the east. The enemy fled north-west towards Mamuandi, and while in pursuit the platoons came across two deserted bases, capturing a large number of RPG 7 rockets in one. They also found drag marks and blood along the trail, indicating that SWAPO had taken casualties at Chana Tofima.
On 24 October, the tactical headquarters moved to Eenhana under command of Major General Ian Gleeson, Officer Commanding 101 Task Force, and two days later, at 20h00, all 12 rifle platoons and the mortar group began moving north to Chana Namuidi under Major Viljoen’s command. In the early hours of 27 October, the mortarists and a protection platoon were in position 800 m north of the chana, from where they were to provide fire support during 32’s attack on Chana Golf. At first light, six platoons moved in from the east for the assault, the remaining five platoons held in reserve two kilometres north of Namuidi. Somehow the attack group misjudged their distance from the target, reaching it only at 08h30, but it was empty in any event and appeared to have been vacated at least a week before. Vehicle tracks and footprints indicated that the enemy had moved further north, and Viljoen’s group was ordered to join the reserve force at Namuidi.
On the way they heard the sound of small-arms fire, RPG 7 rockets and mortars coming from the position of the reserves, which had been attacked by a group of about 30 SWAPO, and suffered one fatality during a ten-minute firefight. By the time the main force reached the reserves, it was 14h10 and the battle was over, but a Puma helicopter sent in to pick up the body of the dead man drew 82-mm mortar fire from the direction of Eheke, indicating that the main target was still occupied by the enemy.
At 16h15 on 27 October, tactical headquarters issued the go-ahead for Special Forces to attack Eheke 1, and for 32 Battalion to attack Eheke 2. But at 04h10 on 28 October, SWAPO launched a pre-emptive strike against the 32 positions with 122-mm rockets and 82-mm recoilless guns, followed by a simultaneous infantry assault from the north-east and north-west, and an RPG 7 barrage from the south-east. In addition to heavy small-arms fire, 60-mm white phosphorous mortar bombs rained down on the 32 men. In the face of a counter-attack SWAPO withdrew briefly, but almost immediately initiated another bombardment with 82-mm mortars and recoilless guns. One member of 32 was killed, and seven wounded by shrapnel.
Tactical headquarters ordered the rifle companies to bombard Eheke 2 as soon as the Special Forces were ready to attack Eheke 1. At 15h10 the bombardment began, and ten minutes later nine platoons started advancing on the target in attack formation, while Pumas flew in to evacuate the dead and wounded and replenish the dangerously low water supply.
Approximately 1,5 km west of the chana, the platoons found a large group of huts containing food and water, which had most likely served as a rest or transit facility. From there, all tracks led to Eheke.
Special Forces attacked Eheke 1 at 16h30, but lost seven men – including Sergeant Vingers Kruger – in a heavy battle. The base 32 was supposed to attack on the southern side turned out to consist of nothing more than a few huts and shelters, with no sign of enemy presence. In rapidly fading light it was impossible for them to carry out further reconnaissance to the south-east, and the platoons joined up with the Special Forces group just before dark, at which point tactical headquarters ordered the immediate withdrawal of all forces back to Owamboland. They began moving south at 21h45 and crossed the border at 06h45 on 29 October.
In his debriefing report on the operation, Commandant Nel recommended that 32 Battalion be equipped with larger calibre support weapons, such as the 140-mm G2 artillery pieces. He also urged that Eheke be attacked again before the end of the year, and that Mulembo and Anime should be attacked in 1978, as these had been identified as the most important SWAPO bases in the area.