Operational Order No. 21, issued by 101 Task Force on 28 March 1977, required 32 Battalion to pinpoint enemy bases or groups on the Angolan side of the border between beacons 26 and 38 as part of Operation Bucksaw.
However, for the first time 32 Battalion was ordered not to attack the enemy, merely to report to Tactical Headquarters on what they found. Assault forces would then be transported in Puma helicopters to launch the attacks, while 32 continued to patrol the area in search of targets.
Five platoons from 32 were already deployed in the area under command of second lieutenants Burman and Kriel, and sergeants S Hearn, Blue Kelly and R Oosthuizen.
The reaction force, waiting at Eenhana, consisted of 60 members of 1 Parachute Battalion, with a company from 8 SA Infantry Battalion held in reserve. Two Super Frelon and three Puma helicopters were available to airlift the troops, two Alouette gunships would provide support, and two Cessnas would be used as airborne command and control centres.
On 30 March the 32 platoons began patrolling the designated area, which stretched six kilometres into Angola. They found numerous tracks, but it was not until 6 April that they made contact with SWAPO. The platoons led by Kriel and Kelly were attacked while lying in ambush after they had been spotted by two individuals on a donkey the night before. The platoon leaders knew reports of their presence would prompt an attack, and deliberately remained in position to wait.
At 11h00, a group of about 100 SWAPO initiated a 30-minute firefight before fleeing in a northerly direction when the helicopter gunships arrived to offer air support. SWAPO suffered two dead, while 32 lost one man and another was wounded. The deserted SWAPO base was found about a kilometre to the north, complete with a trench system.
The patrolling platoons now concentrated on the chanas between beacons 34 and 36, and on the night of 9 April an attack on Sergeant Blue Kelly’s temporary base was repulsed. In a follow-up operation the next day, the platoon found 50 trenches each large enough to accommodate between two and four people about 1,5 km to the north. It was clear that SWAPO was applying the same tactics throughout the area: preparing fallback positions in advance and attacking the patrols, then making for the trenches from where they could launch a second assault in the event that 32 immediately launched a follow-up. When the tactics failed to lure the patrols into the ambushes, SWAPO simply abandoned their positions and moved on. At the base found by Kelly’s men, the spoor of 40 men could be seen heading west, possibly to Chana Golf.
On 12 April, Kriel’s platoon located three deserted enemy bases along the edge of Chana Mamuandi. Five nights later they set up a temporary base three kilometres east of the chana, and the next day found the tracks of at least ten men about a kilometre to the south. They followed the spoor in a southerly direction, and then for about six kilometres to the west. Some 500 m east of Chana Mamuandi, the patrol and an enemy group spotted one another at virtually the same instant and immediately began to exchange fire. Kriel took one of the first hits, in the throat, and another ten men were also wounded, leaving command in the hands of the platoon sergeant, who decided to break off the contact due to the number of casualties taken. The wounded were carried to the border, from where they were casevaced.
By this time the paratroopers from the reaction force had also been deployed in the area, but it was soon apparent that the strategy envisaged would not be effective against the tactics employed by the enemy. On 19 April, the 32 Battalion platoons were redeployed to provide saturation coverage of the area. Two platoons were assigned to the area two kilometres north of Beacon 27, and another two, with what remained of Kriel’s platoon, were sent two kilometres north of Beacon 29 in the vicinity of Chana Tofima. The two eastern platoons deployed along the Odilla River.
On 3 May, after an inexplicable lull in enemy activity, a Cessna sent to conduct an aerial reconnaissance of the area around Tofima spotted trenches on the western side of the chana and vehicle tracks leading north. Sergeant Hearn’s platoon was sent from east of Chana Oanga to carry out ground reconnaissance on this newly located base.
North-west of Tofima, they picked up vehicle tracks running both to and from the north. The base was still under construction, a clear sign that SWAPO was intent on establishing a presence north of Beacon 29, but were being hindered by the 32 patrols. It was later learned that all the recent attacks had been launched by the group involved in building the base.
Patrols between beacons 26 and 28 continued until 21 May, when all the 32 forces drew back to Omauni, no further signs of enemy activity having been found. However, it was strongly suspected that SWAPO had pulled back to a large base somewhere between 20 and 30 km inside Angola.
Bucksaw was the first operation that 32 Battalion conducted in conjunction with the SA Army. In his debriefing report, Major Sedge Dunning, Air Staff Officer for the operation, made the following observation: ‘It seems the battle tactics of 32 Battalion and those of 8 SAI and the Parachute Battalion differ markedly. The standard of clandestine operations conducted by 32 Battalion and those of the other two units cannot be compared. The Parachute Battalion soldiers showed no confidence in their capabilities, as became obvious to their platoon commander, Lieutenant Blaauw, when they informed him that they were astonished at the amount of equipment and ammunition carried by 32 Battalion soldiers, adding that they would have suffered enormous casualties if required to act against SWAPO in Angola, as they had no idea of the enemy’s capabilities.’
Though no one has ever said so, and it is unlikely they would do so now, that report might very well have planted the seed that germinated in 32 Battalion consistently finding itself in the front line for the duration of the Angolan conflict.