Operation Dolfyn (Operation Dolphin) was a military operation in Angola from May 1983 by the South African Defence Force (SADF) during the Angolan Civil War and South African Border War.
The aim of the operation locate and destroy the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) Eastern Command headquarters which was thought to be north of Cuvelai as well any other bases in the area. The operation took place during May and June 1983 and consisted of many small contacts.
Forces were divided into Task Force West under command of Col. Linford and Task Force East was under command of Col. Phillip Lloyd. Each task force was allocated an Air Force MOAT with each MOAT having two Alouette Gunships plus one Alouette troop carrier helicopter under their command.
The operation ended at the beginning of July. The town of Cuvelai would again be the target of the SADF during Operation Askari at the end of December 1983.
From 32 Battalion – The Inside Story of South Africa’s Elite Fighting Unit | Piet Nortje
On 25 April, Alpha, Echo and Golf companies, five of 32’s reconnaissance teams, a mortar group from the State President’s Guard and an engineer element were deployed in the Calolola area. A company from 44 Parachute Brigade was placed on standby. Radio intercepts had indicated a possible SWAPO base 20 km north of Cuvelai. If close reconnaissance confirmed this, it would be attacked on 5 May.
On 3 May, one of the reconnaissance teams set up an observation post on the Camene hill, and at 17h30 another team, scouting the area east of the hill, reported hearing voices and what sounded like people stacking ammunition crates. Similar sounds were picked up the next day, and at 11h30 the team on the hill made contact with nine SWAPO, who more than likely had also hiked up the slopes with the intention of establishing an observation post. One was wounded and captured, while the other eight escaped. The recce team dragged the wounded man to the crest of the hill, where he not only confirmed that a base existed north of the Camene River, but pointed out the direction. It was the same position from which the noise had previously been heard.
The ground commander immediately relayed this information to Oshakati and suggested an attack no later than 16h00, since the captive’s companions would probably reach the base by 15h00 and raise the alarm. At 14h45 Echo and Golf companies were moved into the area to prepare for the attack, and at 15h30 the recce team closest to the base reported a vehicle leaving and heading east. As expected the evacuation had begun, and time was of the essence. Deployment of stopper groups was influenced by the fact that the Air Force had strict orders not to enter the airspace east of the hill. At 16h00 the Officer Commanding Sector 10 halted the advance because the helicopter gunships were not yet ready to take off. Permission was denied for the ground troops to attack without air support. The advance resumed at 16h25, with the ground force drawing heavy fire from three 14,5-mm anti-aircraft guns. The first three gunships joined the battle at 17h55, one immediately being hit by anti-aircraft fire, forcing it to land. It was well after last light before the three 14,5-mm guns were knocked out and the enemy withdrew.
At first light on 5 May the assault force moved in to clean up the base and bury the dead before moving on to Bambi. Their patrol was cut short when a member of the State President’s Guard, the 23rd man in a single file, stepped on an anti-personnel mine that all 22 men ahead of him had miraculously managed to miss. Knowing that SWAPO would investigate the explosion the patrol set up an ambush, killing four of the guerrillas who had indeed come to examine the source of the blast.
On 19 June, Bravo Company’s first platoon made contact with a group of SWAPO guarding an ammunition cache 20 km east of Mupa. When the enemy fled, the patrol destroyed 120 82-mm mortar bombs, 40 anti-personnel rifle grenades and 25 anti-aircraft magazines containing 23-mm shells.
From 21 to 30 June, all the deployed companies made minor contacts, but the next major confrontation was not until 1 July. Alpha Company’s third platoon was waiting to be joined at a temporary base between Dova and Nehone by the first platoon, and when guards saw a group of men in uniform approaching, they assumed the platoon had arrived. Even when the newcomers opened fire, those in the base thought it was a mistake, and instead of returning fire took to the bush to prevent friendly fire casualties.
But the intruders were a group of 50 SWAPO, and because the platoon members had taken only their personal weapons with them, an effective counter-attack was impossible. Sergeant GH du Randt and Rifleman E Cassera were killed, and Second Lieutenant GW Roos, Corporal PG Grobler and two troops wounded. SWAPO looted all the equipment in the base, including 26 bigpacks and groundsheets, 25 sleeping bags, 144 water bottles, an A72 radio and the B22 VHF radio, the only means of making contact with company or tactical headquarters. Lieutenant Gert Kruger’s platoon was despatched from Ionde to rescue the plundered patrol.
On 3 July, SWAPO attacked Alpha Company’s second platoon 20 km north of Dova, where one guerrilla was killed. On 5 July, the same platoon killed another SWAPO on the road between Dova and Nehone. The next month of Dolfyn (dolphin) saw almost daily contact between 32 and SWAPO, until all companies returned to tactical headquarters on 3 August.
